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Abstract
The cognitive signature of unconscious processes is hotly debated recently. Generally, consciousness is thought to mediate
flexible, adaptive and goal-directed behavior, but in the last decade unconscious processing has rapidly gained ground on
traditional conscious territory. In this study we demonstrate that the scope and impact of unconscious information on
behavior and brain activity can be modulated dynamically on a trial-by-trial basis. Participants performed a Go/No-Go
experiment in which an unconscious (masked) stimulus preceding a conscious target could be associated with either a Go
or No-Go response. Importantly, the mapping of stimuli onto these actions varied on a trial-by-trial basis, preventing the
formation of stable associations and hence the possibility that unconscious stimuli automatically activate these control
actions. By eliminating stimulus-response associations established through practice we demonstrate that unconscious
information can be processed in a flexible and adaptive manner. In this experiment we show that the same unconscious
stimulus can have a substantially different effect on behavior and (prefrontal) brain activity depending on the rapidly
changing task context in which it is presented. This work suggests that unconscious information processing shares many
sophisticated characteristics (including flexibility and context-specificity) with its conscious counterpart.
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Introduction
For a long time the extent of unconscious information
processing has been assumed to be limited in scope and restricted
to relatively ‘‘low-level’’ automatic cognitive processes, such as
motor preparation. However, in the last decade the boundaries of
unconscious cognition have been pushed further and further.
Accumulating evidence demonstrates that unconscious informa-
tion processing can influence behavior or trigger cortical activity
previously seen as the domain of conscious cognition. For
example, it has been shown that subliminal priming can be
modulated by several top-down settings of the cognitive system
such as temporal attention [1,2,3], spatial attention [1,4,5,6,7,8,9],
task-set [10,11,12], and strategy or intentions [13,14,15,16].
Further, unconscious information is probably processed all the
way up to semantic analysis [17,18,19,20]. Recently unconscious
information has been observed to influence even ‘‘high-level’’
cognitive functions, such as task selection [21], inhibitory control
[11,22] and decision-making [23]; and to engender activation of
areas in prefrontal cortex (PFC) at high levels of the cognitive and
cortical hierarchy.
Although these (and more) studies have revealed that uncon-
scious information processing is relatively sophisticated, critics
might still argue that the evidence for (high-level) unconscious
cognition is often obtained in situations in which the unconscious
stimulus is consistently and frequently paired with task perfor-
mance on the same conscious stimulus. Then, after (substantial)
practice, unconscious stimuli are able to trigger behavioral and
neural effects, possibly because of increased stimulus-response (S-
R) associations [24]. This interpretation is strengthened by several
studies that have demonstrated a lack of transfer from trained
conscious stimuli to untrained (novel) unconscious stimuli of the
same category [24,25,26,27], suggesting that unconscious influ-
ences on behavior might actually be mediated by strong sensory-
motor links established through learning. Based on these results,
one can argue that unconscious information processing still does
not escape the realm of processes labeled as automatic, low-level
and bottom-up as opposed to the more flexible nature of conscious
processing. However, others have found transfer effects from
practiced to unpracticed (novel) items [13,14,28,29], which
triggered considerable controversies [see 30 for a review].
Here we test whether unconscious stimuli can trigger cognitive
control processes in a goal-directed and flexible fashion or whether
this capability is restricted to cases where information is perceived
consciously. To do so, we designed a Go/No-Go paradigm in
which a target stimulus is preceded by an unconscious prime
stimulus. The unconscious prime could be associated with either a
Go or a No-Go response, determined on a trial-by-trial basis.
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cally and flexibly on every trial (excluding strong S-R learning, see
also [31]). By measuring psychophysics and EEG we show that,
even when strong S-R associations cannot be formed through
learning, an unconscious No-Go stimulus can still trigger PFC-
mediated inhibitory control processes [11,22,32], suggesting that
unconscious cognition is rather flexible and that it might share
several sophisticated properties with its conscious counterpart.
Results
Task overview
Participants (N=27) were instructed to respond as fast as
possible to a Go target by pressing a button with their right index
finger and to withhold their response when they perceived a No-
Go target. The target could be a diamond or a square shape (see
Fig. 1a). Crucially, at the beginning of each trial an instruction cue
signaled which of both stimuli (square or diamond) functioned as
the No-Go target in the upcoming trial. To study the effect of
unconscious information on behavior and brain responses an
unconscious prime (square or diamond) was presented briefly
before the target. Importantly, the same prime stimulus was
associated with a No-Go response on one trial, but with a Go
response on the next (depending on the nature of the instruction
cue). Therefore, stimulus-response associations changed on a trial-
by-trial basis. Importantly, the prime was strongly masked by the
meta-contrast target. The 2-choice discrimination task, adminis-
tered after the main experiment to assess whether primes were
indeed not consciously perceived, revealed that 24 out of 27
participants scored at chance-level (chance-level=50%, binominal
test). Although the other three participants who scored slightly
above chance-level reported not to have seen the primes
(subjectively), the possibility could not be excluded that these
participants perceived the primes consciously on some occasions.
Therefore, these three participants were excluded from further
analyses. Mean discrimination performance across the 24 included
participants was 49.3% (SD=4.3), highlighting that they could not
perceive the primes consciously.
Behavior: unconscious No-Go stimuli trigger response
inhibition
Reaction times (RTs) on Go targets (mean RT=336.6;
SD=59.6) and inhibition rates on No-Go targets (mean inhibition
rate=70.1%, SD=6.0) were comparable to previous Go/No-Go
studies. Intriguingly, although primes were rendered invisible,
participants inhibited their responses more often when a No-Go
target was preceded by a No-Go prime than when it was preceded
by a Go prime (t(23)=6.49, p,0.001), indicating that unconscious
primes affected inhibitory performance on subsequent No-Go
targets (see Fig. 1b). Although prime identity had no influence on
the (near perfect) performance scores on Go trials (Go prime
preceding Go target: mean percentage correct=98.4%, SD=1.7;
No-Go prime preceding Go target: mean percentage cor-
rect=98.6%, SD=2.0; t(23)=1.36, p=0.185), RTs were signif-
icantly slower to Go targets preceded by a No-Go prime compared
to RTs on Go targets preceded by a Go prime (t(23)=4.09,
p,0.001), as if participants attempted to inhibit their response but
failed to do so entirely (see Fig. 1c). Although not successful as
such, the attempt to inhibit may have resulted in a slower buildup
of response activation leading to slower responses. Thus, although
prime (and target) identity changed on a trial-by-trial basis and
therefore strong and stable prime-response associations could not
be formed during testing, No-Go primes were still able to trigger
response inhibition unconsciously, either by increasing the
inhibition rate on conscious No-Go targets, or by slowing down
responses to conscious Go targets.
Because stimulus identity changed randomly across trials, on
some trials the identity of the No-Go stimulus repeated from one
trial to the next, whereas on other trials it changed. Theoretically,
it could be that the observed behavioral effects were completely
due to rapidly learned S-R associations on ‘‘repeat trials’’ (one-trial
learning). To test this alternative hypothesis we re-analyzed the
data and divided our dataset into two parts; repeat trials (same No-
Go stimulus as on previous trial) and change trials (different No-
Go stimulus as on previous trial). If our behavioral effects were
caused by fast S-R learning because of repeating the same stimulus
across trials one would expect to observe larger behavioral effects
for repeat trials compared to change trials. This was not the case.
Unconscious RT slowing was present in both repeat trials
(t(23)=2.72, p=0.012) and change trials (t(23)=3.58, p=0.002).
Further, unconscious inhibition effects were both significant for
repeat (t(23)=5.12, p,0.001) as well as change trials (t(23)=6.58,
p,0.001). To test whether unconscious RT slowing or uncon-
scious inhibition effects interacted with trial type (repeat vs. change
Figure 1. Task design and behavioral results. A) Participants
responded to a Go target and attempted to withhold their response on
a No-Go target. The target could be a diamond or a square shape
depending on the instruction cue that signaled which of both stimuli
functioned as the No-Go target in the upcoming trial. Importantly, an
unconscious (masked) prime was presented briefly before the
(metacontrast) target. Note that prime identity and target identity
(being associated with a Go or No-Go response) varied from trial to trial.
B) Unconscious No-Go primes when preceding a No-Go target resulted
in an increase of 10.8% of the inhibition rate compared to unconscious
Go primes. C) Unconscious No-Go primes slowed-down responded Go
target trials compared to unconscious Go primes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025729.g001
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measures ANOVAs for RTs and inhibition rates separately. No
such interactions were observed for unconscious RT slowing
(F(1,23)=0.81, p=0.38) or unconscious inhibition effects (F(1,23)=
2.84, p=0.11); note that, if anything, these effects were larger for
change trials. Again, these analyses demonstrate that unconscious
information processing is very flexible and does not need (rapid) S-R
learning to sort its effects.
EEG: unconscious No-Go stimuli trigger prefrontal event
related potentials
Figure 2a shows prime-locked ERPs for trials containing a No-
Go target and trials containing a Go target collapsed across prime
identity (No-Go prime, Go prime) as well as the difference wave
(No-Go minus Go). Therefore, this comparison shows the brain
responses related to the conscious activation/implementation of
response inhibition while controlling for possible low-level
congruency effects at the same time (for details see Methods).
Replicating typical ERP findings, we observed a larger frontocen-
tral N2 (peak latency=270 ms, peak difference=0.70 mV;
significant interval=262–273 ms, p,0.05) and P3 (peak laten-
cy=383 ms; peak difference=2.33 mV; significant interval=320–
523 ms, p,0.05) component for No-Go targets compared to Go
targets. Both components peaked at the expected scalp sites and at
typical latencies [33,34,35,36,37,38].
To investigate whether masked primes (association varied on a
trial-by-trial basis) also triggered a larger N2 and P3 component, we
isolated brain activity related to the unconscious activation of
response inhibition (figure 2b). We compared trials with a No-Go
prime with trials with a Go prime (prime-locked, collapsed across
target identity and therefore controlling for low-level congruency
effects). Crucially, unconscious No-Go primes elicited a larger N2
(peak latency=242 ms; peak difference=0.43 mV; significant
interval=211–266 ms, p,0.05) and P3 (peak latency=309 ms;
peak difference=0.28 mV; significant interval=293–316 ms,
p,0.05) component than unconscious Go primes. If these ERP
effects were caused by fast S-R learning one would expect to
observe larger ERP effects for repeat trials compared to change
trials. As with behavior, this was not the case. A repeated measures
ANOVArevealed thattherewerenointeractionsbetweentrialtype
(repeat vs. change) and prime identity (Go vs.No-Go) showing that
unconsciously triggered electrophysiological indices of response
inhibition were not modulated by whether the direct previous trial
was the same or different (F(1,23)=0.31, p=0.59). Further, besides
themaineffectofprimeidentity(F(1,23)=40.86,p,0.001)showing
larger ERP components for No-Go primes compared Go primes,
we also observed a main effect of ERP component (F(1,23)=4.50,
p=0.05). This latter effect highlights that the unconscious ERP
effects were larger for the N2 than for the P3, nicely confirming
previous findings using a stop-signal task including unconscious
stop-signals (not aimed at studying the flexibility [39]). Overall,
these results show that unconscious stimuli not only activate
cognitive control networks in prefrontal cortex, as has been shown
before [11,22], but that they do so in a highly flexible and non-
automatic manner. The latencies as well as the scalp distributions
were highly comparable with the consciously evoked ERP
components, although the strength of both components was
considerably smaller [39]. To rule out that any of these effects
were caused by accidental prime visibility, discrimination perfor-
mance in the 2-choice discrimination task (percentage correct) was
correlated with ERP (mean difference in significant interval for the
N2 and P3) and behavioral indices of unconscious inhibition (RT
slowing and inhibition rates). None of these correlations ap-
proached significance (all ps.0.25). Furthermore, we extrapolated
prime-visibility to the point where the discrimination task showed
zero sensitivity (d9=0) to test whether behavioral and ERP indices
of unconsciously triggered inhibition were still observed (figure 3).
Regression of RT slowing and inhibition rate against d9 resulted in
a significant intercept for RT slowing (intercept=7.8 ms; p,0.001)
and inhibition rate (intercept=10.6%; p,0.001). At the point
where the discrimination task showed zero sensitivity we also still
observed typical ERP indices of inhibition triggered by masked
primes. Linear regression of mean activity differences of the N2 and
the P3 components against d9 resulted in a significant intercept for
the N2 effect (intercept=20.33 mV; p,0.001) and P3 effect
(intercept=0.23 mV; p=0.015) [40,41].
Discussion
In this study we explored the flexibility of unconscious
information processing in the human brain. To this end, we
designed a masked Go/No-Go experiment in which an uncon-
scious prime stimulus preceding a target could either be associated
with a Go or No-Go response. Because the identity of the prime
was varied on a trial-by-trial basis participants had to update S-R
associations dynamically and flexibly on every trial. This
experimental set-up allowed us to test whether PFC-mediated
cognitive control processes [11,22,32] can be triggered in a
flexible, non-automatic manner.
Behaviorally, unconscious No-Go primes preceding No-Go
targets significantly increased inhibition rates compared to uncon-
Figure 2. EEG results. A) Conscious No-Go targets elicited a larger N2
and P3 component than conscious Go targets. B) Unconscious No-Go
primes elicited a larger N2 and P3 component than unconscious Go
primes. The vertical dotted line represents prime presentation. ERPs are
computed for a cluster of frontocentral electrodes of interest (Fz, F1, F2,
FCz, FC1, FC2, Cz, C1 and C2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025729.g002
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before Go targets slowed-down responses compared to unconscious
Go primes. Replicating typical EEG findings, we observed a larger
frontocentral N2 and P3 ERP component for No-Go targets
compared to Go targets. Previous work has shown that both
components are strongly associated with the activation of inhibitory
control in prefrontal cortex [33,34,35,36,37,38,42,43,44,45]. Inter-
estingly, a similar pattern of EEG activity was observed when
comparing unconscious No-Go primes with unconscious Go
primes; both components were observed to be smaller, but peaked
at the expected scalp sites and at similar latencies (although the P3
peaked relatively early in the unconscious comparison). Previous
imaging work using fMRI has demonstrated that unconscious
response inhibition is associated with increased activation in the
inferior frontal cortices (bordering anterior insula) and the pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) [22].
Importantly, these EEG results could not be caused by
differences in low-level stimulus characteristics between conditions
or by low-level stimulus priming effects caused by prime-target
congruency differences because prime-target (in)congruency and
all low-level stimulus features were evenly balanced across
conditions (see Table 1 and Methods). It is also very unlikely that
our behavioral results were driven by feature priming. If so, we
would expect a consistent pattern in the behavioral data, namely
stronger priming effects for congruent prime-target pairs com-
pared to incongruent prime-target pairs. However, inhibition rates
to the target increased when the prime and the target were
congruent (NoGo-NoGo.Go-NoGo), whereas we observed RT
slowing effects to Go targets when the prime and the target were
incongruent (NoGo-Go.Go-Go). This is in line with an inhibition
account (if the prime is associated with inhibition it triggers
behavioral effects irrespective of its physical similarities/differences
to the target), but not with the feature priming account. Moreover,
the finding of typical inhibition-related neural responses further
suggests that our results are caused by inhibitory priming and not
by low-level feature priming.
Previous research has highlighted the importance of (strong) S-
R associations in the impact of unconscious stimuli on brain and
behavior [24,25,26,27,46]. To illustrate, Damian (2001) investi-
gated the role of S-R mappings during masked semantic priming
and showed that priming effects disappear when the prime words
were not part of the response stimulus set (see also Greenwald,
2000). Along similar lines, category set size matters [47], it has
been shown that for small stimulus categories (e.g. numbers
Figure 3. Behavioral and ERP indices of unconsciously triggered inhibition. Linear regression plots showing extrapolated prime-visibility to
the point where the discrimination task showed zero sensitivity (d9=0). Regression plots are adjoined by their 95% confidence boundaries.
Regression of RT slowing (A) and inhibition rate (B) against d9. Regression of the mean (prime identity related) activity differences of the N2 (C) and
the P3 (D) component against d9.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025729.g003
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than for larger categories (e.g. animals), probably because S-R
mapping can more easily be formed for smaller categories [30].
These results suggest that, in some occasions, masked unconscious
primes might directly trigger specific responses while bypassing
any semantic analysis [13].
However, previous evidence as well as the present results
indicate that that is not all there is. For example, Klauer and
colleagues (2007) [48] showed category priming for subliminal
words that were never encountered consciously, when controlling
for confounding factors such as word fragments and even when
using words as primes and pictures as targets. Further,
neuroimaging studies provided evidence for a semantic analysis
of masked words [48,49]. For example, Kiefer and colleagues have
reported a series of studies in which they have shown that prime
words are still processed semantically, as reflected in an enhanced
N400 ERP component to incongruent prime-target pairs (e.g.
‘‘dog-chair’’) compared to congruent prime-target pairs (e.g.
‘‘table-chair’’) [1,50]. A recent meta-analysis on masked priming
effects [30] has nicely bridged both accounts and revealed that
prime novelty indeed explains some of the variance in the reported
effect sizes: strong S-R binding leads to larger effects. However,
significant priming can also be observed for novel primes that are
never encountered consciously.
Here, we took a somewhat different approach to study the
complexity and flexibility of unconscious information processing.
To do so, we mapped an arbitrary stimulus (square/diamond) to
either a left- or right-hand response. Although the stimulus set-size
used was small (it consisted of only two prime stimuli) and was
clear right from the start, subjects had to consciously update their
stimulus response mappings on every trial. In this way, S-R
associations could not be established through practice. Our results
suggest that unconscious information is processed in a flexible and
adaptive manner. Apparently, a consciously instructed task-set can
rapidly determine the processing routes taken by an unconscious
stimulus [10,31] and even when a stimulus is not consistently
associated with a (No-Go) response it can reach the highest levels
of the cortical and cognitive hierarchy. This paints a picture of
relatively flexible and goal-directed processing of unconscious
information, pushing even further the already smart characteristics
revealed recently, such as top-down effects of temporal attention
[1,2,3], spatial attention [4,5,6,7,51], task strategy and intentions
[13,14,15,16] on the processing of unconscious information.
We would like to note that, in the present study, the specific
task-set was always instructed consciously (the cue was always
conscious) and an important next step is to determine whether an
unconscious stimulus can also instruct the task-set in itself or
whether that process is truly restricted to conscious information
[52].
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
All procedures were executed in compliance with relevant laws
and institutional guidelines and were approved by the ethics
committee of the Psychology department of the University of
Amsterdam. Subjects gave written informed consent before
experimentation.
Participants
Twenty-seven undergraduate psychology students of the
University of Amsterdam (20 females, age 19–26) participated in
this experiment. All were right handed, had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, and were naı ¨ve to the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli and procedure
White stimuli (188.4 cd/m
2) were presented against a black
background (0.44 cd/m
2) at the center of a 17 inch DELL TFT
monitor with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The monitor was placed at a
distance of ,90 cm in front of the participant so that each
centimeter subtended a visual angle of 0.64u. Participants were
instructed to respond as fast as possible to a Go target by pressing a
button with their right index finger and to withhold their response
when they perceived a No-Go target. The target could be a
diamond or a square shape (see Fig. 1a, visual angle 2.1u, duration
200 ms). Crucially, at the beginning of each trial an instruction cue
(visual angle 1.78u, duration 750 ms) signaled whether the square
or the diamond functioned as the No-Go target in the upcoming
trial. A prime (square or diamond, visual angle 1.78u, duration
16.7 ms) was presented briefly before the target and was perfectly
masked by the meta-contrast target as evidenced by chance
performance on a 2-choice discrimination task administered after
the main experiment (see Results). The blank interval after target
presentation was jittered pseudo-randomly between 800–1400 ms
(in steps of 200 ms). In sum, the paradigm constituted a 26262
design resulting in eight trial types (see Table 1). Stimuli were
presented using Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems).
Data were gathered in a single EEG session (approximately two
hours) in which participants performed eight experimental blocks,
each containing 112 trials (80 of which contained a Go target, 32 a
No-Go target). Before starting the experimental session, partici-
Table 1. Conditions and labels.
Trial number Cue type Prime type Target type Prime identity Target identity
1 Square Square Square No-Go No-Go
2 Square Square Diamond No-Go Go
3 Square Diamond Square Go No-Go
4 Square Diamond Diamond Go Go
5 Diamond Square Square Go Go
6 Diamond Square Diamond Go No-Go
7 Diamond Diamond Square No-Go Go
8 Diamond Diamond Diamond No-Go No-Go
Note:2 6262 experimental design leading to eight conditions. All trials differed in the type of stimuli that were presented and resulted in different trial identities with
respect to the prime and the target.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025729.t001
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there was a No-Go prime presented before the target, whereas the
other 50% of the trials contained a Go prime. After each block,
participants received performance feedback on the targets (mean
reaction time [RT] and percentage correct stops on No-Go
targets). They were not informed about the presence of the primes
until after the Go/No-Go task. Then, participants performed a 2-
choice discrimination task to assess the visibility of the primes. This
was done at the end of the Go/No-Go task to control for any
learning effects of prime discrimination during task performance.
Stimulus presentation and timing were exactly the same as in the
Go/No-Go task. Before starting the discrimination task partici-
pants were informed about the presence of a prime appearing very
shortly before the target during the Go/No-Go experiment. None
of the participants reported to be aware of the primes during the
Go/No-Go experiment. The 2-choice discrimination task consist-
ed of 56 masked squares and 56 masked diamonds presented in
random order. Participants were instructed to ignore the target
and press the left button when they thought that a square prime
was presented and press the right button when they thought a
diamond prime was presented (target button assignment was
counter-balanced across subjects).
Behavioral analysis
To examine the effect of unconsciously triggered response
inhibition across subjects t-tests (two tailed) were performed on
mean RT on Go targets preceded by a Go versus No-Go prime.
Further, it was also tested whether square root inhibition rates
were higher when a No-Go target was preceded by a No-Go
compared to a Go prime. Reaction times ,100 and .1000 were
excluded from all analyses. Detection performance (percentage
correct) was tested for significance for each individual participant
using a binominal test evaluated at a p-value of 0.05.
EEG measurements and analyses
EEG was recorded and sampled at 1048 Hz using an ANT 64-
channel system (ANT - ASA-Lab system of ASA). Sixty-four scalp
electrodes were measured, as well as four electrodes for horizontal
and vertical eye-movements (each referenced to their counterpart).
After acquisition, EEG data was down-sampled to 256 Hz,
referenced to the average of all channels and filtered using a high
pass filter of 0.5 Hz, a low-pass filter of 30 Hz and a notch filter of
50 Hz. Eye movement correction was applied on the basis of
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) by selecting EEG segments
highly contaminated with eye blinks across recordings (spatial
distribution visually inspected as being eye blinks). Principal
Components Analysis method was used to determine the
topographies of the artifact-free brain signals and the artifact
signals. Finally, the artifact components were removed [53,54].
Artifact correction was applied on all separate channels by
removing segments outside the range of 650 mV or with a voltage
step exceeding 50 mV per sampling point. Baseline correction was
applied by aligning time series to the average amplitude of the
interval from 100 ms to the onset of the prime. All preprocessing
steps were done using Brian Vision Analyzer (BrainProducts) and
ASA (ANT-ASA-Lab).
To study the neural mechanisms of consciously triggered
response inhibition we compared ERPs on trials containing a
No-Go target (Table 1: trials 1, 3, 6 & 8) and trials containing a Go
target (Table 1: trials 2, 4, 5 & 7). By this means we canceled out
any effects caused by the primes. As common in Go/No-Go
experiments, we only included inhibited No-Go trials in all EEG
data analyses. To avoid a prime imbalance due to different
inhibition rates caused by prime identity (see fig. 1B), we equalized
the number of trials from both conditions by randomly sampling
the condition containing the most correctly inhibited trials
(typically No-Go targets preceded by No-Go primes) until this
was equal to the condition with the smallest number of trials
(typically No-Go targets preceded by Go primes).
By comparing ERPs on No-Go prime trials (Table 1: trials 1, 2,
7 & 8) with Go prime trials (Table 1: trials 2, 4, 5 & 6) we
investigated the neural mechanisms of unconsciously triggered
inhibition (and average out the effect of target stimuli). By
collapsing across prime or target identity (depending on the
performed analysis) we cancel out the contribution of any low-level
differences in stimulus presentation between conditions as well as
any contribution from prime-target congruency or incongruency,
thus ruling out that the EEG results are due to low level stimulus
priming effects. All EEG analyses were conducted on difference
waves (No-Go condition minus Go condition).
Numerous experiments have investigated the neural basis of
response inhibition in the Go/No-Go task and revealed the
involvement of a large frontoparietal network, including middle,
inferior and superior frontal cortices, the pre-supplementary motor
area, the anterior cingulate cortex and several basal ganglia
structures [42,43,44,45]. Further, electroencephalographic (EEG)
recordings showed that response inhibition on No-Go trials is
typically related to two Event-Related Potential (ERP) compo-
nents: a frontocentral N2 component (a negative peak around
200–300 ms after No-Go signal presentation) and a centroparietal
P3 component (a positive peak around 300–500 ms after No-Go
signal presentation) [33,34,35,36,37,38]. Although the neural
generators of the N2 and the P3 have not been localized with
certainty, it seems likely that they originate in (or at least rely
strongly on) prefrontal cortex (PFC) [33,36,37,38].
To increase the signal-to-noise ratio, we created a region of
interest based upon the typical spatial distribution of the N2/P3
component observed in many previous studies [33,34,35,36,37,38]
as well as visual inspection of these components in the present
experiment (incorporated electrodes: Fz, F1, F2, FCz, FC1, FC2,
Cz, C1 and C2). On this cluster of electrodes, we performed
random-effects analyses by applying sample-by-sample paired t-
tests, two-tailed around the peaks of interest (N2/P3) to test at
which time points the conditions differed significantly (p,0.05)
from zero [39]. The significant interval for the N2 and P3 was
defined as all bordering significant samples around the peak of
interest. All EEG analyses were performed using Matlab (Math-
works). A repeated measures ANOVA was performed using the
mean activity in the significant time-window of the unconsciously
initiated N2 and P3.
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